The paper introduces and studies a class of heuristic auctions that can be effective for computationally challenging allocation problems, such as the U.S. Federal Communication Commission's problem of buying some TV broadcast rights to create contiguous spectrum for wireless broadband use, with the remaining broadcasters to be retuned into the remaining TV channels subject to hundreds of thousands of interference constraints. The auctions are based on deferred-acceptance (DA) algorithms, which begin with all bids being "provisionally accepted" and reject them iteratively in a "greedy" way. In each iteration, the algorithm assigns a non-negative score to each still-active bid, which is based on the bid amount, the bidder identity, the remaining set of active bidders, and the amounts and identities of previously rejected bids. If no active bid has a positive score, the algorithm terminates and all the active bids become winning. Otherwise, the algorithm rejects the active bid with the highest non-zero score, removing it from the active set, and iterates. Such algorithms generalize a number of algorithms previously studied for matching, clock auctions, and cost sharing.
Deferred-acceptance auctions for single-minded bidders are sealed-bid mechanisms that select winning bidders using a DA algorithm and make payments only to those bidders. (For concreteness we focus on procurement auctions, although the same analysis applies to forward auctions.) If each winning bidders is paid its threshold price, defined as the highest bid the bidder could have made that would still win against the others' bids, then we obtain a deferred-acceptance threshold auction, which is strategyproof for single-minded bidders.
We show that DA auctions have several remarkable properties:
(1) The scoring to be used by the algorithm can be tailored to achieve various goals in computationally feasible ways. For example, to guarantee that the auction yields a feasible outcome, a positive score may only be assigned to the bids that could be feasibly rejected given the previously rejected bids. (For the FCC problem, this means that a feasible assignment of frequencies to the rejected bidders is always maintained.) Furthermore, in the special case in which feasibility constraints are described by a matroid, there exists a DA algorithm that maximizes the total surplus by setting a score equal to the bid amount to every bidder that is feasible to reject. For more complex constraints, surplus maximization may not be achiev- able by a DA algorithm, but it may be approximable using more complex scoring, e.g. weighting bids based on the number of constraints they are involved in, or using "adaptive scoring" that depends on previously-rejected bids. In addition, such adaptive scoring can be used to achieve budgetary goals (such as total revenue or cost constraints), and to reduce the bidders information rents using the logic of "yardstick competition." (2) We establish an equivalence between DA threshold auctions and "clock auctions," in which bidder-specific prices descend and bidders can exit at any moment in time, with bidders who have not exited acquired at their final prices. Namely, when all bidders in a clock auction use "cutoff " bidding strategies (quit when the price falls below some cutoff), such an auction is equivalent to a DA auction, and conversely every DA auction is equivalent to some clock auction in which bidders use cutoff strategies. (3) Both DA auctions and clock auctions are weakly group strategy-proof; that is, no coalition of bidders has a joint deviation from truthful bidding that is strictly profitable for all participants, regardless of bidding strategies used by the others. (For clock auctions, this holds regardless of what information is disclosed to bidders during the auction.) (4) The outcome (i.e., the set of winners and the payments to them) of a deferredacceptance threshold auction (and of the corresponding clock auction) under truthful bidding is also a full-information Nash equilibrium outcome of a paid-as-bid auction with the same bid selection rule. This finding can be interpreted as fullinformation "revenue equivalence:" insistence on strategy-proofness need not raise the auctioneer's cost revenue or reduce its revenue. Furthermore, when we restrict attention to "non-bossy" DA algorithms (ones in which raising a losing bid cannot affect the set of winners), this outcome is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome in undominated strategies of the paid-as-bid auction, and also its unique outcome surviving iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. This property is not shared by any other bid selection rule, and so it can be used to characterize nonbossy DA algorithms.
We show with examples that these properties are not satisfied in general by "greedy acceptance" algorithms or surplus-maximizing algorithms.
